Are Non-OPEC’s Best Days in the Rear-view Mirror

A post by Ovi at peakoilbarrel.

While this post updates Non-OPEC production to January 2020, we are now in late May and the direction for future production for the next few years is clear, LOWER than where it was in March 2020. OPEC, in response to the reduced worldwide demand, arranged for a production reduction through a Declaration of Cooperation (DoC) with OPEC and Non-OPEC countries. Also Canada and Norway have indicated they will be cutting production in response to world wide reduced demand. The OPEC + DoC reduction schedule and chart are shown and discussed at the end of this post.

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Non-OPEC Oil Production Punches New High

A post by Ovi at peakoilbarrel

As I wrote in my previous post, preparing these last two has been a surrealistic exercise. The oil market environment for this post has been even more surrealistic than the previous one and the associated futures contract prices have been extremely volatile this week. The May WTI front month contract went negative on April 20 for the first time ever and closed at negative $37.63/bbl while the June contract closed at $20.43. Today’s settled price, April 24, for the June contract is $16.94.

On April 7th, OPEC + finalized a record oil production cut of 9.7 Mb/d after days of discussion. The 9.7 million bpd cut will begin on May 1 and will extend through the end of June.  The cuts will then taper to 7.7 million bpd from July through the end of 2020, and 5.8 million bpd from January 2021 through April 2022. The 23-nation group will meet again on June 10 to determine if further action is needed.

The lone hold out to the deal was Mexico which was expected to cut 400 kb/d but would only agree to 100 kb/d. This was a real Mexican standoff and Mexico won because they had hedged their oil output and the more the price dropped, the more they made on their hedges. According to this report, they hedged their oil at $49/bbl in January. It was unclear how many barrels were hedged or how much was spent.

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Non-OPEC Output Reaches New High

Below are a number of oil (C + C ) production charts for Non-OPEC countries created from data provided by the EIA’s International Energy Statistics and updated to October 2019.  Information from other sources such as the IEA and OPEC is used to provide a short term outlook for future output and direction.

Non-OPEC production increased by 382 kb/d to 50,930 kb/d in October from 50,512 kb/d in September. This is second highest monthly increase for 2019 after the August increase of 699 kb/d.

October’s production exceeded the previous high of 50,919 kb/d reached in December 2018 by 11 kb/d. Gains from Norway, U.S, and Canada overcame declines from other countries to post the new October record.

Contrast what has happened with output in 2019 with 2018.  From December 2017 to December 2018, production increased from 47,768 kb/d to 50,919 kb/d, an increase of 3,151 kb/d. Of this, the three largest contributors were U.S., Russia, and Canada.  From December 2018 to October 2019, production so far has increased by 11 kb/d. How much will the next two months add?

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Non-OPEC Production Growth is Struggling

A Post by Ovi at peakoilbarrel.

Below are a number of oil (C + C ) production charts for Non-OPEC countries created from data provided by the EIA’s International Energy Statistics and updated to September 2019. Information from other sources such as the IEA and OPEC is used to provide a short term outlook for future output and direction.

Non-OPEC production decreased by 22 kb/d from 50,512 kb/d in August to 50,490 kb/d in September. This is another output reduction month in 2019. In 2019 there have been 5 months of decline and 4 months of increases. For comparison purposes, in 2018, there were 9 monthly increases and 3 decreases. This is just another indicator of the increasing difficulty Non-OPEC countries will have boosting output going forward, now that US production growth has started to slow.

September production is just 287 kb/d short of the previous high of 50,777 kb/d reached in December 2018. Will new output from Norway and Brazil, along with small but increasing US output coming in the next few months raise Non-OPEC output beyond the previous December 2018 high?

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Norway Production, 2017 Summary and Projections

A Guest Post by George Kaplan

Average annual Norwegian wellhead C&C production dropped 1.5% in 2017, from 1709 kbpd (625 mmbbls total) to 1682 kbpd (614 mmbbls total). Wellhead gas (which includes fuel gas, flaring and gas injection) rose 2.6% from 2805 kboed to 2878 kboed. Exit rates were down 9% for oil andt 4% for gas, some of which was due to the Forties pipeline failure in December, but the decline appears to have continued in the first quarter of 2018.

Three small projects, Flyndre, Sindre and Birding, and two larger ones Gina Krog and Maria, came online. Sindre appears already to be exhausted. Flyndre is shared with UK and is declining fast. Gina Krog, discovered in 1974, is a tie back via a wellhead platform to Sleipner with nominal nameplate capacity of 60 kboed (split about evenly between oil and gas), and Maria is an oil tie-back to the Kristin semi-sub, but with water injection supplied from Heidrun, with 40 kbpd nameplate and is still ramping up after first production in December.

Norway C&C

The data shown in the charts is through February, but the NPD figures for this year have not been as complete or unequivocal as usual, so should be considered accordingly. A number of fields have no reported wellhead figures for January or February, though they do have sales reported (to fill the gaps I have prorated from these numbers based on previous complete monthly data). Additionally it looks for some reason that the sales figures for 2017 have all been doubled and the numbers for NGL are being switched from reporting in Te/d to m3/d, so there’s a bit of uncertainty.

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Troll

Troll, started in 1990, is by far the largest gas producer but also, currently, the largest oil producer, at around 150 kbpd, which has been kept steady for several years. The oil comes from a thin oil rim, produced from long, horizontal wells that are being continually drilled. The oil has to be produced before the gas cap can be blown down. R/P for the oil is about two and a half years, and the contract for Troll Phase 3, the gas reserves over the oil rim, was awarded this January with production expected in the second half of 2021. This would suggest the oil production will be kept high, and then start to drop quickly through 2020. Troll gas current reserves are almost half depleted and with an R/P of over twenty years, but the approved production rate has recently been increased to make up for declines in other fields, and this may continue.

The original development plan by Shell for Troll was to ignore the oil as they did not think it could be developed economically, mainly because it would have required hundreds of vertical wells; this was rejected by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Short horizontal wells had previously been drilled in USSR (actually in the 1930s), Australia and Alaska but in the late 1980s extensive, and expensive, development for long reach, accurately placed horizontals, drilled from offshore floating rigs, was conducted by Norsk Hydro with NPD input. In the early 90s I remember Norwegian news outlets complaining that they perceived this as a waste of tax-payers money, but the effort has certainly paid off since. A similar large oil rim resource, Frigg, was not produced in an earlier gas development and was lost; by contrast Troll Oil will produce almost two billion barrels.

Statfjord

Statfjord, started in 1979, is still a large producer, at about 25 kbpd, many years after its original decommissioning date, although there are signs now of decline, which is likely to be terminal. It straddles the UK-Norway border and about 15% is owned by the UK through the local Statoil subsidiary. Interestingly at one time, by maritime law, the UK could have claimed all of the Norwegian Trench, which includes Statfjord and several other of the largest Norwegian fields, but instead agreed to a border based on the meridian line between the two countries. I think the UK oil and gas authority had been reporting UK Statfjord production as total rather than the UK share, maybe by wishful thinking, which has skewed some numbers and has only been corrected in the last few months.

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The irregularity in Goliat production shows up in the curves for recent additions, but there is a clear trend for quite early and rapid decline, even among the larger developments.
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